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GRAY v. NETHERLAND
99 F.3d 158 (4th Circuit 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Coleman Gray was indicted for the capital murder of Richard
McClelland during the commission of robbery. 1 The evidence presented
by the Commonwealth tended to show that during the early morning
hours of May 3,1985, Gray and an accomplice, MelvinTucker, abducted
McClelland, the manager of Murphy's Mart, as he was driving home
from work. At gunpoint, Gray forced McClelland into his vehicle, drove
back to the convenience store, and ordered McClelland to unlock the
door.
2
After stealing approximately $13,000 in cash, Gray drove to an
isolated road and parked. He ushered McClelland out of the car, forcing
him to lie face down on the ground behind the vehicle. As McClelland
begged for his life, Gray rapidly fired six shots into the back of his head.
Gray and Tucker then returned to McClelland's car, and, in an attempt to
destroy the evidence, doused the automobile with gasoline and set it on
fire.3
On December 2, 1985, the morning the guilt phase of Gray's capital
murder trial was to begin, defense counsel requested the court to order the
Commonwealth to reveal all the evidence it planned to use at the
sentencing phase to prove future dangerousness should Gray be con-
victed. The prosecutor indicated that the Commonwealth would only
introduce "evidence of statements [Gray] ha[d] made to other people
about other crimes he ha[d] committed of which he ha[d] not been
convicted."'4 In particular, the Commonwealth indicated that it was
prepared to introduce statements Gray allegedly made to co-defendant
Tucker, as well as other inmates, in which he admitted to being the
triggerman in the murder of Lisa Sorrell and her daughter.5 Upon further
questioning by defense counsel, the Commonwealth's attorney flatly
stated that, outside of statements Gray had made to other people, no other
evidence would be presented regarding the uncharged misconduct.
6
The jury found Gray guilty of capital murder. The night before the
sentencing hearing was to begin, the Commonwealth's attorney notified
Gray's counsel that it would be introducing additional evidence tending
1 Gray was charged under former Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(d),
currently Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4).
2 Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 340-41, 356 S.E.2d 157,
172 (1987).
3 Id. at 341-42, 356 S.E.2d at 172-73.
4 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074,2078 (1996).
5 Id. Lisa Sorrell and her daughter were murdered approximately
five months before McClelland was killed. Lisa Sorrell was shot six
times in the back of the head and left slumped in the front seat of her
partially burned car. Three year-old Shanta, found locked in the truck of
the car, died from carbon monoxide inhalation. Gray v. Commonwealth,
233 Va. at 345-46, 356 S.E.2d at 175.
6 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2078. The following conversa-
tion took place in-chambers between defense counsel and the prosecutor
before the trial began:
MR. MOORE: Is itgoing to be evidence orjust his statements?
MR. FERGUSON: Statements that your client made.
MR. MOORE: Nothing other than statements?
MR. FERGUSON: To other people, that's correct. State-
ments made by your client that he did these things. Id. at 2086.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
to show that the manner in which Lisa Sorrell and her daughter were
killed resembled McClelland's murder. Specifically, the Common-
wealth planned to introduce: photographs of the crime scene; pictures of
the bodies of Lisa and Shanta Sorrell; testimony of Detective Slezak who
investigated the murders; and testimony of the medical examiner, Dr.
Presswalla, who had performed the autopsies on the Sorrells' bodies.
7
Before the sentencing phase began, defense counsel attempted to
have the additional evidence excluded, arguing that it "exceeded the
scope of unadjudicated-crime evidence admissible for sentencing under
Virginia law."'8 Likewise, Gray's counsel stated that the "[d]efense was
taken by surprise" and "not prepared to try the Sorrell murders." 9 Gray's
counsel further argued that due to the assurances made by the
Commonwealth's attorney before trial, the defense was unprepared to
rebut any evidence other than the statements allegedly made by Gray.
10
The trial court denied defense counsel's request, finding that "the Sorrell
murders evidence was 'admissible at this stage of the trial."' 11 All of the
evidence was admitted, and the jury sentenced Gray to death finding both
the future dangerousness and vileness aggravating factors. 
12
On direct appeal, Gray's conviction and sentence were affirmed.
His state habeas corpus petition was dismissed, and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari tvice.
13
Gray petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district
court. The district court granted the writ, and subsequently vacated
Gray's sentence. 14 The court held that "due process rights were violated
'because the Commonwealth failed to provide fair notice that evidence
concerning the Sorrell murders would be introduced at his penalty
phase.' 15 The Commonwealth appealed the issuance of the writ to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
16
The circuit court reversed, ordering that, based on the "new rule"
doctrine of Teague v. Lane,17 Gray's federal habeas corpus petition must
be dismissed. 18 Gray then applied for a stay of execution, and petitioned
for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 19 The Court
granted certiorari, finding that Gray's due process claim actually con-
tained two distinct claims: a notice-of-evidence claim and a misrepresen-




It Id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
12 1d. at 2078-79.
13 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d 158, 160 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
14 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted).
15 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2088 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
16 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 62 (citations omitted).
17 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
18 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 67. See discussion of Teague v.
Lane analysis, case summary of Gray v. Netherland, Capital Defense
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 5-6 (1996).
19 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2080.
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tation claim.20 The Court found that Gray's notice-of-evidence claim
required a "new rule" under Teague, and, consequently, did not provide
him with a basis for relief.21 With regard to the misrepresentation claim,
the Court concluded that the Commonwealth may have affirmatively
misled the defense. Because the procedural posture of this claim was
unclear, however, the Court remanded the case directly to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to determine if the claim
was defaulted and, if not, to decide it.
22
HOLDING
On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that Gray's misrepresentation claim was not raised or
addressed prior to being raised before the United States Supreme Court.




I. What Level of Specificity is Required to Adequately Raise a
Constitutional Claim in the State Court to Ensure Federal
Review?
The Gray court held that in order for habeas corpus relief to be
granted, petitioner's misrepresentation claim "must include reference to
a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the
facts which entitle the petitioner to relief."24 Likewise, the court held that
"[wihen the appeal is to a constitutional guarantee as broad as 'due
process,' it is incumbent upon a habeas petitioner to refer to the 'particu-
lar analysis developed in the cases' and not just to due process in general
in order to present his claim. ' ' 25 Relying on Picard v. Conner,26 the court
further stated that a "statement of facts sufficient to support a constitu-
tional claim without reference to the legal basis for that claim is not
sufficient."
27
Despite the confidence with which the court of appeals set forth this
standard, counsel should note that the United States Supreme Court has
not clearly articulated the level of specificity required to permit federal
court review. In fact, the Court in Taylor v. Illinois, held that general
reference to a constitutional guarantee may be adequate for habeas
corpus relief in some instances.28
In Taylor, the State argued that the United States Supreme Court
should deny jurisdiction over Taylor's Sixth Amendment claim "be-
cause it was inadequately presented in the state court."'29 Although the
Court noted that Taylor did not "specifically articulate his [S ixth Amend-
ment] claim based on the Compulsory Process Clause until he filed for
rehearing in the Illinois Appellate Court" and that on direct appeal he
"expressly asserted only a due process violation," the Court, neverthe-
20 Id. at 2081.
21 Id. at 2083-84.
22 Id. at 1082-83. See also, case summary of Gray v. Netherland,
Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. I, p. 5 (1996).
23 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 159.
24 1d. (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2081).
25 Id.
26404 U.S. 270 (1971).
27 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 162 (citations omitted).
28 484 U.S. 400,406 n.9 (1988).
29 Id.
30 1d. Taylor's quotation from People v. Rayford,356 N.E.2d 1274
(1976), cited Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), and Chambers v.
less, concluded that Taylor's use of a quotation from a state case, which
cited and relied on two United State Supreme Court Compulsory Process
Clause cases, adequately presented his Sixth Amendment claim to the
state courts.30 The Court held:
A generic reference to the Fourteenth Amendment is not
sufficient to preserve a constitutional claim based on an
unidentified provision of the Bill of Rights, but in this case the
authority cited by petitioner and the manner in which the
fundamental right at issue has been described and understood
by the Illinois courts make it appropriate to conclude that the
constitutional question was sufficiently well presented to the
state courts to support our jurisdiction.
3 1
Hence, the level of specificity required to adequately present a
constitutional claim before a State court to ensure federal habeas review
may be adequate as long as the "issue has been described and understood
by the [state] courts."
'32
It is important to note, however, that the Picard Court required that
in order to exhaust his state remedies a petitioner must "present the state
courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts. '33 Although
the Court noted that a petitioner's federal claim does not have to cite
"'book and verse off] the federal constitution,"' the constitutional claim
inherent in the facts must be first brought to the attention of the state
courts before a federal habeas corpus writ will be issued.34 Because
Picard did not raise his equal protection claim until it was "injected" by
the court of appeals, the Court found that the claim had not been raised
in state proceedings and was, therefore, barred.35 Therefore, until the
United States Supreme Court addresses this issue directly, defense
counsel should articulate each federal claim with the greatest specificity
possible to ensure that such claim is adequately presented to the state
courts, and not later defaulted.
I. The Misrepresentation Claim
A. The State Record
The court of appeals first reviewed the proceedings in the state
courts to determine if Gray had previously presented his misrepresenta-
tion claim. Afterreviewing the record of the sentencing hearing, the court
concluded that if "Gray believed he had been misled, he never indicated
as much to the trial judge.' ' 36 Although the court admitted that Gray was
"surprised" by the prosecutor's actions, it found that Gray simply argued
that he had not been given adequate notice and that the evidence should
be excluded, "[r]ather than claiming that he had been tricked or affirma-
tively misled by the prosecution.
'37
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The Rayford court held that "the use
of the preclusion sanction in crimial cases should be limited to extreme
situations because in criminal cases 'due process require[d] that a
defendant be permitted to offer testimony of witnesses in his defense."'
Taylor, 484 U.S. at 407 n.9 (emphasis in original).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Picard, 404 U.S. at 276.
34 Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
35 Id. at 277-78.
36 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 162.
37Id.
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After Gray's motion to exclude the additional Sorrell evidence had
been denied by the trial court, the prosecution called Detective Slezak to
the stand.38 Again, Gray objected to the presentation of this evidence,
reiterating that he" 'had no notice of this' evidence and "had been'taken
by surprise." ' '39 Gray's counsel emphasized that "[w~hat the prosecutor
'is going to do today' . . . 'is not what he said he was going to do at the
beginning of the trial."' 40 In granting Gray's motion for federal habeas
corpus relief, the district court found that "'[the only Sorrell murder
evidence which [Gray's lawyers] were prepared to challenge'... 'was
the evidence [the prosecutor] indicated he would introduce at the outset
of the trial,"' and that the "prosecutor's surprise move had disarmed
Gray's counsel.... with the result that the Sorrell murders evidence
'carrie[d] no assurance of reliability.' 41 Although one could plausibly
argue that Gray did not claim he was "affinnatively misled" during the
sentencing phase of his trial, the more sensible interpretation of the facts
is that he did.
After concluding that Gray did not properly present a misrepresen-
tation claim at the trial level, the court turned to whether the claim was
properly raised on direct appeal in the Supreme Court of Virginia. Gray
argued that he "placed the issue of misrepresentation before the Virginia
courts" when he stated in his Brief on Direct Appeal that the Common-
wealth withheld the additional Sorrell murders evidence from him
"'upon the conclusion of the guilt trial,' after he was earlier assured that
only statements from inmates would be introduced.42 Dismissing Gray's
contention, the court concluded that "Gray d[id] not allege that the
Commonwealth Attorney's misrepresentation ... caused him injury....
Rather, he state[d] a claim that the Commonwealth did not comply with
the 'preferred practice' of providing the defendant notice of penalty
phase evidence.' 43 This, held the court, was the exact argument that the
"Supreme Court held'would require the adoption of a new constitutional
rule."'44
Because the court determined Gray had not raised the misrepresen-
tation claim at any time prior to his state habeas corpus proceeding, and
that he was aware of the facts which made up his claim, Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-654(B)(2)45 prevented the court from reviewing "the misrepre-
sentation claim on its merits."'46 The court reiterated that Gray had
previously argued that he lacked notice to respond to the additional
Sorrell evidence, not that "he was somehow lulled or tricked by the
Commonwealth Attorney's initial indication that he would present only
witnesses who would testify that Gray told them he committed the Sorrell
murders. ' 47 The court acknowledged, however, Gray's assertion that the
prosecution's actions were "'simply outrageously unfair and made a
mockery of Gray's rights to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 48 Nevertheless, the court concluded that this assertion
was "much too vague to meet the specificity requirement of Anderson v.
Harless... and was inadequate to 'provide the [Virginia] courts with a
"fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal principles to the facts
bearing on his constitutional claim.'
' 49
38 Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
39 ld. at 2087-88 (citations omitted).
40 1d. at 2088 (citations omitted).
41 Id. (citations omitted).
42 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 162 (citations omitted).
43 Id. at 162-163.
44Id. at 163 (quoting Gray v. Netherland 116 S. Ct. at 2084).
45 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-654(B)(2) states that "[nlo writ shall be
granted on the basis of any allegation the facts of which the petitioner had
knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition."
46 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 163.
47 Id.
48 Id. (citations omitted).
As the court noted, even if Gray had procedurally defaulted his
misrepresentation claim, it may have been "excused on a showing of
'cause and prejudice.' 50 The court determined, however, that Gray did
not state any cause for his failure to raise his misrepresentation claim.
Even if Gray had shown cause, however, the court held that Gray "failed
to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth's Attorney's
allegedly misleading notice" because the lack of such notice did not work
"'to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his [sentencing]
with error of constitutional dimensions.' 5 1
To demonstrate that Gray would have been unable to meet the
required level of prejudice to excuse his default, the court focused on
Gray's claim that had he not been misled, he "would have been able to
discover various exculpatory evidence as to [his] involvement in the
Sorrel[l] murders," specifically, investigating the possible role thevictim's
estranged husband played in those murders. 52 Because Gray did not
investigate the claim further in the twenty-one days between his sentenc-
ing hearing and the day his sentence became final, the court concluded
that this demonstrated "that the Commonwealth Attorney's supposed
misrepresentation concerning the scope of the Sorrell murder evidence
did not prejudice [Gray]." 53 The court missed the mark.
The fact that Gray did not undertake an investigation after the
sentencing hearing is not determinative as to whether he was prejudiced.
In assessing whether Gray was prejudiced, the court should have focused
on the effect the prosecutor's actions had on Gray's rights at the
sentencing hearing itself. Two points can be made to illustrate this fact.
First, at the sentencing hearing the burden is on the Commonwealth to
"prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon
evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing serious threat to society" such that death is the appropriate penalty.
54
Before imposing a sentence of death, the court may set aside the verdict
if good cause is shown. 55 The burden, however, no longer rests with the
prosecution. It is the defendant who has the burden of demonstrating
"good cause." Second, although the United States Supreme Court found
that Gray had defaulted his Brady claim, it does not mean that the
Commonwealth did not have the obligation to produce such evidence.
Consequently, Gray's prejudice was not lessened merely because he did
not undertake an investigation after the sentencing hearing.
B. The Federal Record
The court held that if Gray had previously raised his misrepresen-
tation claim in the district court and the court of appeals, the Common-
wealth would have been required at that time to assert the affirmative
defense of procedural bar, or have waived it.56 The court concluded,
however, that Gray had not previously raised his misrepresentation claim
in the lower federal courts; therefore, the "Commonwealth [was allowed
49 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)).
5 0 Id. at 164 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750
(1991)).
51 Id. (quoting Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971, 977 (4th Cir.
1995)). It is difficult to understand the court's use of the word "allegedly"
regarding the prosecutor's tactics. Regardless of whether the claim was
raised, Gray was plainly misled. See supra note 7.
52 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 164.
53 Id.
54 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C).
55 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5.
56 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 164.
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to] assert the procedural bar and foreclose further consideration of Gray's
misrepresentation claim."
'57
The court found that Gray did not previously raise his misrepresen-
tation claim in any federal proceeding with "the clarity required by
Picard and Harless."58 Following the reasoning discussed in Picard, the
Harless Court, reversing the holdings of the district court and the court
of appeals, found that Harless did not "provide the state courts with a 'fair
opportunity' to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing
upon his constitutional claim."59 Hence, his federal writ of habeas corpus
was, likewise, barred.
60
In concluding that Gray did not raise his misrepresentation claim in
the district court or court of appeals, the court was correct. Gray
presented adequate facts on which to base his misrepresentation claim in
both proceedings, but it was not until he reached the United States
Supreme Court that he cited cases which directly supported his misrep-
resentation claim.6t Even if the court were to apply the more deferential
specificity standard found in Taylor, it does not appear that Gray had
articulated an adequate constitutional claim of misrepresentation in
either the district court or the court of appeals. Thus, the court's finding
that Gray had not raised his misrepresentation claim at a lower federal
proceeding and that the Commonwealth was, therefore, "free to maintain
its defense of procedural default," is adequately supported by prece-
dent. 62
57 Id.
58 Id. (see Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982)).
59 Harless, 459 U.S. at 6.
60 Id. at 8.
61 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 166. Specifically, Gray cited
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) (holding that defendants who
detrimentally relied on assurance of committee chairman could not be
III. Application in Virginia
Unfortunately, Gray was executed in spite of what anyone can see
as basic unfairness because his attorney did not say "continuance" and
did not say "misrepresentation." In other words, Gray was executed
because of a technicality.
Gray's legal journey raises some important issues that must be
addressed. First, because the Commonwealth, and at times the courts,
will try to divide claims for the purpose of asserting that the issues were
procedurally defaulted, it is imperative that defense counsel argue all
possible claims in both broad and specific terms. Furthermore, more than
just the facts must be presented. Each issue should be tied to a constitu-
tional claim with adequate federal precedent supporting each issue.
Although this court did not specifically address the issue, language
in the opinion indicates that it may be possible to preserve a claim for
default purposes if it is raised at the post-sentence hearing conducted
pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5.63 Until this issue is decided,
counsel should continue to make this argument if it is plausible in a
specific case.
Summary and Analysis by
C. Cooper Youell, IV
punished from doing so), and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
(forbidding prosecution from engaging in "a deliberate deception of
court and jury"), as support for his misrepresentation claim. Unfortu-
nately for Gray, however, he had not cited these cases in an earlier
proceeding.
621d.
63 Although unclear, a defendant may be able to have a sentence of
death set aside with a showing of "good cause." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.5.
BEAVER v. THOMPSON
93 F.3d 1186 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On April 12, 1985 Gregory Warren Beaver shot and killed Trooper
Leo Whitt of the Virginia State Police during a routine traffic stop.
Beaver was charged with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing
of a law enforcement officer for the purpose of interfering with his
official duties under Va. Code § 18.2-3 1(f). I The court appointed John
Maclin IV to represent Beaver and granted Maclin's request to appoint
T.O. Rainey III as co-counsel. Rainey had a private law practice and was
a part-time assistant prosecutor in neighboring Dinwiddie County. 2
I This section has been changed to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(6).
2 Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996).
3 Id. at 1189.
On July 9, 1985, Beaver pleaded guilty to capital murder. The
Commonwealth, in exchange for Beaver's guilty plea, agreed not to
argue the defendant's sentence. The trial court found that the Common-
wealth had proven future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt and
sentenced Beaver to death.3 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his
conviction and sentence.4 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
5
Beaver, with different court-appointed counsel, filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Prince George County.
Beaver raised twelve claims in all, ten of which were flatly denied or
4 Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 352 S.E.2d 342 (1987).
5 Beaver v Commonwealth, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987).
